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Abstract
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium
is at least a .743-fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents’ values
are independently distributed. The previous best bound was 1 − 1/e ≈ .63, derived in
Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) using smoothness, the standard technique for reasoning about
welfare of games in equilibrium. In the worst known example (from Hartline et al. (2014)),
the first price auction achieves a ≈ .869-fraction of the optimal welfare, far better than the
theoretical guarantee. Despite this large gap, it was unclear whether the 1−1/e ≈ .63 bound
was tight. We prove that it is not. Our analysis eschews smoothness, and instead uses the
independence assumption on agents’ value distributions to give a more careful accounting of
the welfare contribution of agents who win despite not having the highest value.
1 Introduction
There has been a wealth of recent progress in mechanism design understanding the performance
of resource allocation mechanisms through worst-case analysis. Such results, often termed price
of anarchy results, typically bound the expected welfare in equilibrium of a mechanism without
requiring the theorist to solve analytically for the equilibria being studied.
The first price auction is a canonical example of the successes of such an approach. It
has been known since Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) that the first-price auction is guaranteed
in equilibrium to achieve at least a e−1
e
fraction of optimal social welfare. This bound was
shown to be tight in the case of Bayes-Nash equilibrium when bidders’ values are correlated
(Syrgkanis, 2014), as well as in the simultaneous composition of multiple first-price auctions
with submodular and subadditive valuations(Christodoulou et al., 2016).
However, in the most commonly studied setting with independently distributed values over
a single good, there has been a persistent gap between this welfare guarantee and the worst
known example of Hartline et al. (2014), in which the social welfare is a .869-fraction of the
optimal social welfare. Despite the prevalence of the first-price auction format, the salience of
the independent values assumption, and the ubiquity of the techniques used to prove the existing
e−1
e
bound, it was not clear whether this bound was tight in the independent values setting.
In this paper, we prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 1. The expected welfare of any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the first-price auction with
independently-distributed bidders is at least a .743-fraction of the optimal welfare.
This improves on previous best bound of e−1
e
≈ .63 discussed above.
1.1 Approach
The standard approach to proving worst-case bounds on the welfare of auctions is via smoothness,
a technique formalized in Roughgarden (2009), and developed for mechanisms in Syrgkanis and Tardos
(2013). Using a deviation-based argument, smoothness breaks the expected welfare of a mech-
anism into two parts: the contribution from agents’ utility and the revenue of the auction. A
welfare guarantee follows from deriving a tradeoff lowerbounding the sum of these two quantities
To prove Theorem 1, we instead consider instead a different pair of quantities: the welfare
from “rightful” winners (that is, winners who win and have the highest value) and that from
those who the mechanism improperly allocates (that is, agents who win despite not having
the highest value). One way to derive a tradeoff between these two quantities would be to
lower bound the value of an improper winner by their payments made to the mechanism. The
alternative derivation of the e−1
e
bound in Hartline et al. (2014) implicitly follows this approach.
To prove a guarantee stronger than e−1
e
, we derive a sharper lower bound on the value of
improperly allocated agents. Rather than taking these agents’ payments as a lower bound on
their values, we show that improper winners beating other, higher-valued agents must be facing
a similar optimization problem to the rightful winners. Since these improper winners are also
bidding higher than the rightful winners, it must be that their values are not too much lower than
the values of those who should win. Carefully aggregating this lower bound over all types of all
agents yields Theorem 1. Notably, our lower bounding argument makes use of the independence
assumption on agents’ value distributions, unlike the proofs that yielded the previous results.
1.2 Structure
In Section 2, we discuss our relationship to the literature on first-price auctions and worst-
case welfare analysis in mechanism design. We then outline the formal model and technical
preliminaries in Section 3. In the subsequent three sections, we present the proof of our main
result. We begin by re-deriving the e−1
e
bound from Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) in a way
that will allow for direct comparison to our new approach while developing several technical
lemmas that will be useful in proving the tighter welfare bound. In Section 5, we present the
sharper lower bound on the values of improperly allocated agents. Finally, in Section 6, we show
how to combine the lower bound in Section 5 with the approach outlined in Section 4 to prove
Theorem 1.
2 Related Work
The first-price auction presents a daunting obstacle to classical economic analysis because equi-
libria in the first-price auction are notoriously difficult to compute theoretically. For exam-
ple, when Vickrey (1961) first observed that first-price auctions have equilibria which are not
welfare-optimal, computing the equilibria of two bidders with asymmetric uniform distribu-
tions was posed as an open question. This question was only answered fifty years later in
Kaplan and Zamir (2012). While other literature in economics has sought to understand equi-
libria in other special cases (e.g. Plum (1992)), a broader view has proved elusive. Indeed, for the
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related setting of several first-price auctions run simultaneously, Cai and Papadimitriou (2014)
show that there are computational reasons why such equilibria are challenging to characterize.
To circumvent this obstacle, recent analyses have resorted to worst-case analysis over all
equilibria. These approaches allowed the theorist to reason about equilibrium without ever
solving for one. The most prevalent tool for this task is smoothness, pioneered in Roughgarden
(2015) and adapted for auctions by Syrgkanis (2014) and Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013). In the
case of the first-price auction, this approach has yielded the best known bound of e−1
e
, mentioned
in the introduction. This bound also extends to the simultaneous composition of multiple
first-price auctions (Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013) when bidders have fractionally subadditive
valuations. Smoothness has seen applications far beyond the first price auction; we refer the
reader to the excellent survey of Roughgarden et al. (2016) for a broader picture.
The e−1
e
bound however has only been shown to be tight in two situations: the single-item
setting when agents’ values are correlated (Syrgkanis, 2014), and in the multi-item case with the
simultaneous composition of multiple first-price auctions Christodoulou et al. (2016).
For revenue, Hartline et al. (2014) show that the smoothness-based welfare bounds for the
first-price auction extend to the objective of revenue as well, assuming the auctioneer has re-
cruited sufficient competition or sets proper reserve prices.
Our approach falls outside the standard smoothness framework. In the space of mechanism
design, it is one of few such welfare bounds which are not smoothness-based. We mention two
others of note. First, Borodin and Lucier (2010) consider combinatorial auctions, and prove
that mechanisms based on greedy allocation algorithms have equilibria which are approximately
welfare-optimal. Second, Christodoulou et al. (2015) consider full-information equilibria of the
all-pay auction, and provide tight worst-case welfare guarantees.
3 Technical Preliminaries
We now lay the formal groundwork for our result. This paper analyzes the single-item sealed-
bid first-price auction. In such an auction a single item is sold to n agents. Each agent i
simultaneously submits a bid bi to the auctioneer. The agent i
∗ with the highest bid wins the
item, and pays their bid bi∗ . All other agents pay nothing and win nothing. Let x˜i(b) denote the
indicator for whether agent i is allocated under bid profile b, and let p˜i(b) denote the payments
made by agent i under that same bid profile. Each agent evalutes their allocation and payment
using the linear utility function u˜i(b) = vix˜i(b) − p˜i(b), where vi is agent i’s value for service,
also called their type.
We consider a Bayesian environment, in which each agent i’s value is drawn independently
from a distribution with CDF Fi and density fi. Note that we do not require agents’ value dis-
tributions to be identical. We assume agents’ values are private, but that the prior distributions
are common knowledge. Given a value vi for agent i, we will sometimes refer to vi’s strength in
i’s distribution by the quantile qi(vi) = Fi(vi) of that value.
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We adopt the standard solution concept of Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE). Informally, a
BNE is a strategy mapping bi(·) from values to bids for every agent such that each agent’s bid
given their value maximizes their expected utility given the strategies of other bidders. Formally,
1Note that this definition of quantile gives strong values high quantiles. This differs from the definition of
quantile often used in the literature on revenue maximization in auctions. The reason for this difference is
consistency: we discuss quantiles of other random variables, in which it is standard to define quantiles such that
high values have high quantile.
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given a profile b(·) of bidding strategies for each agent, define the interim allocation probability
of agent i bidding b to be x˜i(b) = Ev−i [x˜i(b,b−i(v−i))]. Similarly, define the interim expected
payments of agent i to be p˜i(b) = Ev−i [p˜i(b,b−i(v−i))]. Define the interim expected utility u˜i(b)
similarly. A profile of bidding strategies b(·) is a BNE if for every agent i with value vi, the
following best response inequality holds for every alternate bid b: u˜i(bi(vi)) ≥ u˜i(b).
In what follows, we argue assuming agents are bidding according to an arbitrary BNE profile
of bidding strategies. Since the strategies map values to bids and bids are mapped to allocation
and payments, we will often consider allocations, payments, and utiltities as a function of value,
taking the bid functions as implicit. Formally, we will let xi(vi) = Ev−i [x˜i(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))],
pi(vi) = Ev−i [p˜i(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))], and ui(vi) = Ev−i [u˜i(bi(vi),b−i(v−i))]. Note that we use
tildes when the argument to the function is a bid, and omit the tildes when an argument to the
function is a value instead.
We study the objective of utilitarian social welfare. The social welfare of a BNE is the
expected value of the winner. In other words, WELF(b(·)) =
∑
i vixi(vi). As our benchmark,
we compare to the expected value of the bidder with the highest value, i.e. Ev [maxi vi]. This
is the welfare of the mechanism which always allocates the highest-valued agent, which can be
achieved in equilibrium by a second-price auction. We will state our performance guarantees for
the first-price auction as a fraction of this benchmark welfare.
Finally, we note that it will be useful to consider allocation probabilities, expected pay-
ments, and expected utility in smaller probability spaces, conditioning, for example, on agent
i having the highest value with value vi. Given such an event E , we will use the shorthand
x˜i(b | E) = Ev−i [x˜i(b,b−i(v−i)) | E ] to denote the allocation probability of agent i given a bid of
b conditioned on this event, and so on for payments and utilities.
4 Warmup: Proving the Standard Bound
Before proving Theorem 1, we rederive the e−1
e
bound of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) in order
to highlight the ways in which the proof of our main result differs. In doing so, we will derive
several lemmas which will be useful in the proof of the tighter bound. Formally, we will re-prove
the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013); Hartline et al. (2014)). The expected welfare of any
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the first-price auction with independently-distributed bidders is at
least a e−1
e
-fraction of the optimal welfare.
To prove Theorem 2, we break the welfare of the first-price auction into two quantities: the
welfare from agents who win in both the first-price auction and the optimal allocation, and the
contribution to welfare from agents who win in the first-price auction, but are not the highest-
valued agents. More specifically, we consider the contribution for an arbitrary agent i in the
event that agent i has value vi, and that this is the highest value. We denote this event Ei(vi).
Conditioned on Ei(vi), we will show that the expected value of the winner of the first price
auction as a fraction of vi. Formally, we will write the welfare in the following way:
Lemma 3. Given any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the first price auction, let i∗ be the random
variable given by i∗ = argmaxi bi(vi) (breaking ties arbitrarily). The expected welfare in any
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the first-price auction can be written as
n∑
i=1
∫
fi(vi)Pr [Ei(vi)]
(
vixi(vi | Ei(vi)) + E [vi∗ | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i]Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)]
)
dvi. (1)
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Similar to the approach in the smoothness-based proof of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013), we
use payments made by the winner to lower bound that agent’s contribution to the mechanism’s
welfare. More formally, given a value profile v, let τi(v−i) denote agent i’s threshold bid. That
is, τi(v−i) is the bid of the highest bidder other than i; i wins if and only if bi(vi) ≥ τi(v−i)
(modulo tiebreaking). When i loses the auction, the winner pays their bid, which is τi(v−i)
by definition. Lower bounding agent i’s threshold bid will then translate to revenue and hence
welfare. We produce such a lower bound with the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let τi(z, vi) be the threshold bid with quantile z in the distribution of τi(v−i) condi-
tioned on Ei(vi). That is, τi(z, vi) is the value such that the probability that τi(v−i) ≤ τi(z, vi) is
exactly z. Then as long as τi(z, vi) ≥ bi(vi):
τi(z, vi) ≥ vi −
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
z
(2)
Proof. We prove the lemma in two steps. First, we prove a best response inequality for bi(vi)
conditioned on Ei(vi). While bi(vi) may not maximize agent i’s utility conditioned on this event,
we show that it does yield better utility than any higher bid. We then use this best response
inequality to prove (2), by noting that xi(vi | Ei(vi)) is the CDF of τi(z, vi), conditioned on Ei(vi).
To prove a best response inequality conditioned on Ei(vi), we first compare u˜i(b | Ei(vi)) to
u˜i(b). In terms of the CDFs Bj(·) and Fj(·), we have that
u˜i(b) = (vi − b)x˜i(b) = (vi − b)
∏
j 6=i
Bj(b). (3)
Meanwhile, conditioned on i having the highest value of vi, we have
u˜i(b | Ei(vi)) = (vi − b)x˜i(b | Ei(vi))
= (vi − b)
∏
j 6=i
Pr [bj(vj) ≤ b | Ei(vi)]
= (vi − b)
∏
j 6=i
min
(
Bj(b)
Fj(vi)
, 1
)
(4)
It is clear from (3) and (4) that the ratio u˜i(b | Ei(vi))
u˜i(b)
is decreasing in b. But then for any
b > bi(vi), we have
u˜i(b | Ei(vi))
u˜i(b)
≤ u˜i(bi(vi) | Ei(vi))
u˜i(bi(vi))
. Since bi(vi)) ≥ u˜i(b), this can only be the case
if u˜i(bi(vi) | Ei(vi) ≥ u˜i(b | Ei(vi)). In other words, for all b > bi,
ui(vi | Ei(vi)) ≥ (vi − b)x˜i(b | Ei(vi)) (5)
We now derive the bound (2). The allocation rule x˜i(b | Ei(vi)) is the probability that a bid
of b is higher than the bids of all agents other than i, conditioned on the event Ei(vi). It follows
that x˜i(b | Ei(vi)) can also be thought of as the CDF (i.e. the quantile function) of this threshold
bid, conditioned on Ei(vi). We may therefore write our conditional best response inequality (5)
as:
ui(vi | Ei(vi)) ≥ (vi − τi(z, vi))z. (6)
Rearranging yields the lemma.
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The lower bound of Lemma 4 is stated in terms of the quantile of agent i’s threshold bid. We
may compute expectations by integrating over quantiles to produce the following lower bound
on the value of the winning agent when i loses:
Lemma 5. For any agent i with value vi, the following inequality holds:
E [vi∗ | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i]Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)] ≥ vi(1− xi(vi | Ei(vi))) + ui(vi | Ei(vi)) ln
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
vi
.
The proof of the lemma requires integrating over all quantiles of agent i’s threshold bid, and
noting that this threshold bid is a lower bound on the value of i∗. We defer the proof to the
appendix.
Proof of Theorem 2. Plugging the lower bound of Lemma 5 into (1), we have that the expected
welfare from the first-price auction is at least:
n∑
i=1
∫
fi(vi)Pr [Ei(vi)]
(
xi(vi | Ei(vi)) + vi(1− xi(vi | Ei(vi))) + ui(vi | Ei(vi)) ln
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
vi
)
dvi
=
n∑
i=1
∫
fi(vi)Pr [Ei(vi)]
(
vi + ui(vi | Ei(vi)) ln
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
vi
)
dvi
≥
n∑
i=1
∫
fi(vi)Pr [Ei(vi)]
(
(1− 1/e)vi
)
dvi.
The final line comes from minimizing vi + ui(vi | Ei(vi)) ln
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
vi
over all possible values of
ui(vi | Ei(vi)) between 0 and vi. We therefore have the following lower bound on the BNE welfare
of the first-price auction:
(1− 1/e)
n∑
i=1
∫
fi(vi)Pr [Ei(vi)] vi dvi.
The result follows from noting that the sum in the above expression is exactly the optimal
expected welfare.
Discussion: The proof strategy above uses the same principles as other existing welfare guar-
antees for the first price auction, e.g. Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013): it combines a contribution
to the welfare of the highest-valued agent when they win with a lower bound on the welfare
when they lose. The lower bound on the welfare when i loses takes the form of revenue, which
can be lower bounded via a best response argument as above (or in Hartline et al. (2014), or
via a deviation-based smoothness argument, as in Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013).
Both the proof from Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) and that of Hartline et al. (2014) can be
formulated in a way that does not require the assumption that agents’ values are independently
distributed. The proof above, on the other hand, uses the independence assumption in the proof
of Lemma 4. The conditioning on the event Ei(vi) in the welfare breakdown in Lemma 3 makes
this necessary. As we will see below, this conditioning will prove necessary to get a bound better
than e−1
e
.
6
5 Value Lower Bounds for Misallocated Agents
The proof of Theorem 2 broke the welfare into the contribution of the event Ei(vi) for all agents
i and values vi. This welfare contribution was in turn broken into two parts: the value from
i when they win in the first-price auction, and the value from the winner i∗ when i does not
win. In the proof of Theorem 2, the value from i∗ was lower bounded by that agent’s payments.
In this section, we take advantage of the independent values assumption to prove a sharper
characterization of the value contribution from i∗.
To attain this sharper bound, we find symmetry in the bidding problems i and j face through
their common opponents: everyone else. Factoring out the symmetric aspects of outbidding the
other agents allows us to lowerbound the utility j would receive from deviating to bidding bi
and hence the utility they receive in equilibrium bidding bj . Lemma 6 captures this lowerbound.
The final bound comes then from integrating numerically over all quantiles qi.
We formalize this intuition below.
Lemma 6. Let agent i have value vi, quantile Fi(vi) = qi. Then in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
for any agent j with value vj, if bj(vj) ≥ bi(vi), then:
vj ≥ vi
bj(vj)
vi
− (1− qi)
bj(vj )
vi
bi(vi)
vi
− qi
bi(vi)
vi
1− qi −
bi(vi)
vi
+
bj(vj)
vi
qi
(7)
Proof. In what follows, we suppress the dependence of the best response bids bi and bj on vi
and vj for brevity. Because i and j are bidding in equilibrium, we know that i would prefer not
to bid bj, and j would prefer not to bid bi. That is:
(vi − bi)x˜i(bi) ≥ (vi − bj)x˜i(bj)
(vj − bj)x˜j(bj) ≥ (vj − bi)x˜j(bi).
Because agents have independent value distributions, we may write the bid allocation rules x˜i(·)
and x˜j(·) in terms of the CDFs of each agent’s bid distributions, Bk(·). We have that x˜i(b) =∏
k 6=iBk(b), and x˜j(b) =
∏
k 6=j Bk(b). This allows us to divide the best response inequalities
above and cancel Bk(b) for any k /∈ {i, j}. In other words, we have
(vi − bi)
(vj − bi)
Bj(bi)
Bi(bi)
≥
(vi − bj)
(vj − bj)
Bj(bj)
Bi(bj)
.
Let qj = Fj(vj), and qi = Fi(vi) be the quantiles of agent i and j in their respective value
distributions. Since bj ≥ bi and best response bids must be increasing in value, Bj(bi) ≤
Bj(bj) = qj. Since we also have Bj(bj) = qj, Bi(bi) = qi, and Bi(bj) ≤ 1, we have:
(vi − bi)
(vj − bi)
qj
qi
≥
(vi − bj)
(vj − bj)
qj.
Cancelling qj from both sides and rearranging yields the lemma.
The parameterization by quantile of Lemma 6 is particularly important: at qi = 0, Equa-
tion (7) gives vj ≥ bj , exactly the bound used in Theorem 5 to arrive at the
e−1
e
bound. At
quantile qi = 1, the bound gives vj ≥ vi.
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Lemma 6 lower bounds vj in terms of the value vi of agent i, the quantile qi of agent i, and
the two agents’ bids, bi(vi) and bj(vj). In what follows, we will use denote this lower bound
function by
v(vi, qi, bi, bj) ≡ vi
bj
vi
− (1− qi)
bj
vi
bi
vi
− qi
bi
vi
1− qi −
bi
vi
+
bj
vi
qi
.
The proof of Theorem 1 amounts to using v(vi, qi, bi(vi), bi∗(vi∗)) instead of τi(v−i) as a lower
bound on the value of the winner i∗ in the event Ei(vi) when i
∗ 6= i, and combining this with
the a lower bound on bi∗ obtained from applying Lemma 4.
6 Proof of Theorem 1
We now integrate the sharper bound of Lemma 6 into the proof framework outlined in Section 4.
We begin by lowerbounding the value of the winner vi∗ when i should win with value vi but
loses.
Lemma 7. For any agent i with value vi and quantile Fi(vi) = qi, the following inequality holds:
E [vi∗ | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i]Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)] (8)
≥ vi
(
1− ui(vi | Ei(vi))
vi−bi(vi)
)
− (1− qi)ui(vi | Ei(vi)) ln
(
1 + vi−bi(vi)−ui(vi | Ei(vi))(1−qi)ui(vi | Ei(vi))
)
.
The proof of the lemma proceeds in four steps. First, we note that vi∗ ≥ v(vi, qi, bi, bi∗).
Second, we show that v(vi, qi, bi, bi∗) is increasing in bi∗ . This allows us to substitute the lower
bound on bi∗ derived in Lemma 4 to bound v(vi, qi, bi, bi∗) in terms of the quantile qi of agent
i’s value and the quantile of agent i’s threshold bid. Integrating over the quantiles of agent i’s
threshold bid yields the result. We defer the full details to the appendix.
Proof of Theorem 1. We have lower bounded the value of the winner vi∗ conditioned on Ei(vi)
in terms of vi, ui(vi | Ei(vi)), and qi. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we will minimize this lower
bound over all possible choices of ui(vi | Ei(vi)), holding the other two parameters fixed. We will
encounter two challenges in applying this approach. First, to eliminate the dependence of the
lower bound on qi, we will need to integrate over all quantiles of agent i. Second, there will not
be a simple worst-case choice of ui(vi | Ei(vi)), as there was before. We will nonetheless produce
a constant by solving the optimization problem numerically.
We begin by restating our lower bound on the welfare of the first-price auction. The total
welfare is
n∑
i=1
∫
fi(vi)Pr [Ei(vi)]
(
vixi(vi | Ei(vi)) + E [vi∗ | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i] Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)]
)
dvi.
Using the lower bound of Lemma 7, the fact that xi(vi | Ei(vi)) = ui(vi | Ei(vi))/(vi− bi(vi)), and
algebra, we obtain:
n∑
i=1
∫
fi(vi)Pr [Ei(vi)]
(
vi − ui(vi | Ei(vi))(1 − qi) ln
(
1 + vi−bi(vi)ui(vi | Ei(vi))(1−qi)ui(vi | Ei(vi))
))
dvi.
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Note that this expression is increasing in bi(vi). Taking bi(vi) = 0 and rewriting the welfare in
terms of agent i’s quantile qi, we obtain the lower bound:
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
Pr [Ei(vi(qi))] vi(qi)
(
1− ri(qi)(1− qi) ln
(
1 +
1− ri(qi)
(1− qi)ri(qi)
))
dqi,
where ri(qi) = ui(vi(qi) | Ei(vi(qi)))/vi(qi). Note that the minimum of
1− ri(qi)(1− qi) ln
(
1 +
1− ri(qi)
(1− qi)ri(qi)
)
over ri(qi) ∈ [0, 1] now depends on qi. Define
ℓ(qi) = min
ri(qi)∈[0,1]
[
1− ri(qi)(1 − qi) ln
(
1 +
1− ri(qi)
(1− qi)ri(qi)
)]
We have may lower bound the welfare of the first price auction as:
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
Pr [Ei(vi(qi))] vi(qi)ℓ(qi) dqi.
Finally, let γi(qi) = Pr [Ei(vi(qi))] vi(qi). We may lower bound the equilibrium welfare as:
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
γi(qi)ℓ(qi) dqi =
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
(
γ′i(qi)
∫ 1
qi
ℓ(t) dt
)
dqi − γ(s)
∫ 1
s
ℓ(t) dt
∣∣∣∣
1
s=0
=
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
γ′i(qi)
∫ 1
qi
ℓ(t) dt dqi
≥
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
γ′i(qi)
(
min
x
∫ 1
x
ℓ(t) dt
1− x
)
(1− qi) dqi
=
(
min
x
∫ 1
x
ℓ(t) dt
1− x
)
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
γ′i(qi)
∫ 1
qi
1 dt dqi
=
(
min
x
∫ 1
x
ℓ(t) dt
1− x
)
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
γi(qi) dqi.
The first line follows from integration by parts. The second line follows from the fact that
γ(0) = 0. The fourth line follows again from integration by parts. Since
∑n
i=1
∫ 1
0 γi(qi) dqi is
equal to the expected optimal welfare, all that remains is to compute
min
x
∫ 1
x
ℓ(t) dt
1− x
,
which will in turn yield our welfare bound. Doing so numerically yields the value stated in the
theorem.
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A Deferred Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider a realization of v in which i does not win. This means that i’s bid
is less than its threshold bid τi(v−i), while the bid of the winner, i
∗, is at least τi(v−i). Since in
equilibrium agents don’t overbid, we have that vi∗ ≥ τi(v−i). We therefore have that:
E [vi∗ | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i] Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)] ≥ E [τi(v−i) | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i] Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)] . (9)
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To evaluate the quantity on the right-hand side of (9), we will integrate over the quantile space
of agent i’s threshold bid τi(v−i). We obtain the following sequence of inequalities:
E [τi(v−i) | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i] Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)] =
∫ 1
xi(vi | Ei(vi))
τi(z, vi) dz
≥
∫ 1
xi(vi | Ei(vi))
vi −
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
z
dz
= vi(1− xi(vi | Ei(vi))) + ui(vi | Ei(vi)) log(xi(vi | Ei(vi)))
≥ vi(1− xi(vi | Ei(vi))) + ui(vi | Ei(vi)) log
(
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
vi
)
.
The second line follows from the lower bound of Lemma 4, the final from noting ui(vi | Ei(vi))
vi
≤
xi(vi | Ei(vi)).
Proof of Lemma 7. By definition, vi∗ always bids higher than bidder i with value vi, in the
event that i 6= i∗. We may therefore begin by applying Lemma 6, which states that vi∗ ≥
v(vi, qi, bi, bi∗). Hence, we may lower bound the right-hand side of (8) by
E [v(vi, qi, bi, bi∗) | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i] Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)] .
Next, we show that ∂v(vi,qi,bi,bi∗)
∂bi∗
≥ 0. Computing the derivative and rearranging it yields
that
∂v(vi, qi, bi, bi∗)
∂bi∗
=
(1− qi)(1−
bi
vi
)2
(1− qi −
bi
vi
+
bj
vi
qi)2
≥ 0.
Note that as long as i∗ is outbidding agent i, it must be that bi∗ ≥ τi(v−i). By Lemma 4
we therefore have bi∗ ≥ vi −
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
z
, where z is the quantile of τi(v−i) in its distribution
conditioned on the event Ei(vi).
Hence, we may write
E [v(vi, qi, bi, bi∗) | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i] Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)]
≥ E
[
v
(
vi, qi, bi, vi −
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
z
)
| Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i
]
Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)] . (10)
As in the proof of Lemma 5, we may compute the right-hand side of (10) by integrating over
the quantiles of τi(v−i). That is, E [v(vi, qi, bi, bi∗) | Ei(vi), i
∗ 6= i] Pr [i∗ 6= i | Ei(vi)] is at least∫ 1
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
vi−bi
v
(
vi, qi, bi, vi −
ui(vi | Ei(vi))
z
)
dz.
Evaluating the integral yields the inequality stated in the lemma.
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